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INTRODUCTION
Significant  strides  have  been made toward the  goal of achieving free
trade in sugar and agricultural-based  sweeteners  in North America.  Although
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  spells out the steps to be
taken that will allow the parties involved to transition to free trade, the process
has not been painless.  To put it mildly, disagreement exists regarding interpre-
tation of the Agreement.  Initial disagreements  are exacerbated  through a vari-
ety of cross-effects as sectors undergo structural change as a result of the agree-
ment and,  in turn, affect the profitability  of other sectors.
The purpose  of this paper is  to provide  a thorough  review  of current
and potential NAFTA disputes related to sugar and agricultural-based sweeten-
ers.  The paper will proceed by, first, providing an overview of the North Ameri-
can  Free Trade Agreement  as  it relates  to sugar and high fructose corn syrup
(HFCS).  The paper then discusses the current environment within the NAFTA
countries,  particularly  the United  States  and Mexico,  with respect  to various
factors  related to production  and  consumption.  Next, various  disputes  stem-
ming from the Agreement  will be outlined.  Of particular importance  are  dis-
putes  related  to Net  Surplus  Production  Status  and  various  issues  related  toKennedy and Petrolia  235
dumping.  The paper concludes with implications  of the Agreement and current
disputes.
NAFTA SUGAR  AGREEMENT  OVERVIEW
The North American Free Trade Agreement,  modified by an Executive
Agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  Mexican  governments,  provides  increased
duty-free  access during a 15-year transition period to the U.S. sugar market for
Mexican "net surplus sugar production" beginning January  1994.  Upon comple-
tion of this transition period, the U.S. and Mexican sugar markets will be merged
into  a common market.
Between  years one  and fifteen,  Mexico's  allowable duty-free exports
to the United States,  and U.S.  duty-free exports to Mexico, will be the greater
of 1) 7258 metric tons  (mt);  2) the quantity currently  allocated by the United
States under the sugar program to "other specified  countries and areas"; or 3)
the quantity allowed under the definition of "net surplus producer"  (FAS). For
exports to exceed the current quota level of 7258 metric ton,  each country must
become  a net surplus  producer (production  exceeding consumption).  During
years one to six of the agreement,  in each year that Mexico or the United States
is projected to be a surplus producer of sugar, duty-free access will be provided
by the other country for the net production surplus,  up  to 25,000 mt.  In year
seven,  the net production  surplus will increase to 250,000 mt (FAS).
Under  the U.S. tariff-rate  quota system (TRQ),  the initial  16 cent sec-
ond tier tariff rate imposed on Mexican imports  will be reduced by  15 percent
during years one to six.  Mexico has agreed to align its tariff regime with that of
the United States,  implementing a TRQ with rates equal to those of the United
States, by year seven of the agreement (FAS). Mexico will also adopt the U.S.
second-tier tariff as a common border protection to non-NAFTA  sugar by year
seven of the agreement.  During years seven to fifteen,  the remaining U.S. and
Mexican tariffs on bilateral sugar trade will be reduced to zero (Rosson et al.).
In another key  component  of the  agreement,  rules-of-origin,  require
that for sugar to qualify for preferential  tariff treatment it must be produced in
the exporting  country.  The refining of raw sugar does not demonstrate origin.
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However,  both countries  will  allow  duty-free  access  for  raw  sugar imported
from the other country  if it is refined in the importing country  and re-exported
to the producing  country  (FAS).  Initial over-quota duties  of $0.16 per pound
on Mexican imports will be reduced  and eventually eliminated (Rosson et al.).
High fructose  corn  syrup (HFCS),  a product that is  a close substitute
for  sugar in uses  such as  soft drinks, plays  an integral  part in the agreement.
The Executive Agreement  specifies that consumption of HFCS will be used in
the  determination  of net surplus  producer status.  To achieve  net surplus  pro-
ducer status and increased duty-free access to the United States market, Mexico's
production of sugar must exceed its combined consumption of sugar and HFCS
(American  Sugarbeet Grower's Association).  Both U.S. and Mexican duties on
high fructose corn syrup are  set to be phased out over ten years.  This should
allow United States agribusinesses  to export additional HFCS to Mexico as per
capita incomes in Mexico increase  and import demand for sweeteners expands.
It  appears  unlikely that Mexican  capacity  exists to  keep pace  with projected
HFCS  demand  without  additional  investment  in infrastructure  and increased
corn production  (Rosson et al.).
As originally negotiated prior to modifications executed by the Execu-
tive Agreement,  Mexican  access  in year  seven would  have  been increased  to
150,000  mt, with  10 percent increases  annually over the remainder  of the fif-
teen year transition.  In addition,  the NAFTA would have  granted Mexico  un-
limited access  for its exportable surplus  sugar in years seven  to fifteen  when-
ever Mexico reached net exporter  status during two consecutive  years  (Haley
and Suarez).
However, the Executive Agreement  eliminates the two-year unlimited
access  clause.  As a result, the 250,000 mt access  conceded in year seven is an
absolute  ceiling.  Beginning in year seven,  and for the remainder of the transi-
tion period for sugar, Mexico will be allowed to ship its net production surplus
to the United States duty-free,  up to a maximum of 250,000 mt.  United States
duty-free  access  to  the  Mexican  market  will,  in  turn,  be  determined  by  the
United States net production surplus,  also with a cap of 250,000 mt.  The calcu-
lation of net production surplus for both countries will be carried out annually.
For the purposes of this calculation, consumption of high fructose corn syrup is
236 NAFTA -Report Card  on AgricultureKennedy and Petrolia  237
Table  1:  Duty-free  Sugar Access Provisions of NAFTA.
NAFTA Sugar Provisions with Side  Letter
Mexican Access to  U.S.  Market  Provisions
Years  1-6 (1994-1999)
Mexico not surplus  producer 1 Greater of 7,258 MT or "other
country" share of import quota.
Mexico surplus producer 1 25,000 MT
Years 7-14 (2000-2007)
Mexico not surplus producer 1 Greater of 7,258 MT or "other
country" share of import quota
Mexico surplus producer1 250,000 MT
NAFTA Sugar  Provisions without Side Letter
Mexican Access to U.S.  Market  Provisions
Years  1-6 (1994-1999)
Mexico not surplus producer2 Greater of 7,258 MT or "other
country"  share of import quota.
Mexico surplus producer2 25,000  MT3
Years  7-14 (2000-2007)
Mexico not surplus producer2 Greater of 7,258 MT or "other
country"  share of import quota
Mexico surplus producer 2 Initially 150,000 MT,  increasing
10%  per year3
1Surplus sugar production  is calculated  as sugar production  minus  sugar and
HFCS  consumption.
2Surplus sugar production  is calculated as sugar  production  minus sugar
consumption.
3Maximums  can be exceeded if Mexico has achieved  net production  surplus
status for two consecutive marketing  years.
Source: Economic Research  Service,  1999; and  Haley, 2000.
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included with consumption of sugar for both countries.  More  specific details
related to this issue are presented in Table  1 (Haley  and Suarez).
Continuation of the "Rules-of-Origin" would continue to prevent trans-
shipment of sugar from  third countries.  Implementation  and  continuation  of
the common external tariff discourages Mexico's substitution of imported sugar
for its domestic needs to export Mexican produced sugar to the United States.
In order to originate,  all processing of sugarcane or sugar beets must take place
in NAFTA territory.  Unprocessed  cane or beets  may be imported for process-
ing, but they must be re-exported to the original exporting country.  To qualify
for NAFTA preference,  100 percent of the sugar (production,  processing,  and
refining)  must be NAFTA in origin (FAS), a stipulation that may prove difficult
to monitor.
The U.S. refined  sugar re-export program will remain  in place for ex-
ports to Mexico.  U.S. shipments under the program will receive Mexico's MFN
tariff rate,  as opposed to the NAFTA preferential  rate.  The United States and
Mexico  will each allow duty-free  access  to imports  of  raw  sugar that will be
refined in the importing country and then re-exported to the original exporting
country as well as refined sugar that has been refined from raw sugar produced
in and exported from the other country (FAS).  In recent years the United States
has  supplied  20-25 percent  of the Mexican  import  market,  mainly  under the
sugar re-export program.
THE  PRODUCTION  / MARKETING  ENVIRONMENT
Increased  capacity  in  the Mexican  sugar  industry is  at the  center of
much  of the dispute.  During the four years immediately following  the imple-
mentation  of NAFTA,  Mexican  production  increased  by  1.7  million  mt raw
value  (MTRV)  to a record of nearly  5.5 million MTRV  in  1998.  These levels
are  projected to remain high with production  of 5.04 and 5.15 million MTRV
for marketing  years  1999 and 2000, respectively  (Haley  and Suarez).
This increase in Mexican sugar production can be attributed,  in part, to
an increase  in the amount of land devoted to sugarcane  production combined
with  several  technological  and producer  incentive  measures  that  have been
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implemented.  Sugarcane  area fell to  less than 482,000 hectares  in  1992,  ap-
proximately  18 percent  lower than 1987 levels.  However, by 1997,  a return to
1987  harvested  area  levels was  accompanied by sugar production  22 percent
higher than  1987 levels.  This can be attributed to new technologies responsible
for increased sugar recovery rates, combined with an expansion of the effective
milling season from  130 to 175 days (Haley and Suarez).  Additional enhance-
ments  to  the infrastructure  have  been  provided by the Mexican  government.
These  include  the  provision  of several  forms  of support  which  enables  the
Mexican  sugar industry  to maintain both high domestic  prices  and high pro-
duction levels.  Among these, a public development bank for the sugar industry,
Financiera  Nacional  Azucarera  SA  (FINASA),  supports  the industry  by pro-
viding over $US 1.3 billion of financing to the Mexican sugar sector (Haley and
Suarez).
The Mexican government also controls the quantity of sugar marketed
domestically,  establishing the amount of sugar that can be exported or must be
held in stock.  Exportable  quantities are divided among sugar companies, with
a penalty system used to discourage the domestic sales of targeted exports.  In
addition, the government provides domestic stockholding subsidies to keep sugar
out of the domestic  market. At the other end of the spectrum, the government
supports the sugar sector through sugar import control.  However, under NAFTA
Mexico  is required to adopt a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system by the year 2000
with third country rates harmonized to the tariff levels maintained by the United
States.
Although increased efficiency  in the Mexican sugar industry has cre-
ated  the potential  for increased  exports to  the United  States,  expanded  U.S.
HFCS  production  capability has  compounded  the problem.  The  U.S.  HFCS
industry is hopeful that NAFTA provisions  will provide another market for it's
production.  Due to increased capacity, this industry has been plagued in recent
years  with excess  production.  Estimates  show that HFCS  annual  production
capacity  has  grown by  3.5  million tons  between  1994 and  1997  (Haley  and
Suarez).
Although HFCS  consumption  has increased  by more than  13  percent
during this same time period, the increases have not kept pace with production
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capacity.  Prices  have  adjusted  accordingly.  The  ratio  of the  HFCS-42  spot
price to the beet-sugar wholesale price fell below 0.60 in the fourth quarter of
1995,  dropped to 0.40 for  1997 and 1998,  then increased to 0.42 in early  1999.
The  Bureau  of Labor Statistics  producer  price  index  for the  HFCS  industry
declined  from  117.6 in the final quarter of 1995 to an average of 77.6 in 1998.
Given  this  pressure  on prices,  the  industry was  faced  with  a difficult  adjust-
ment  process;  many  small  firms  left  the sector  with others  seeking  arrange-
ments with  larger companies  (Haley and Suarez).
The prospect of increased HFCS exports  to Mexico was welcomed by
the U.S. industry.  Given that HFCS-55 is used primarily in soft drinks and that
annual  sugar use by  the  Mexican  soft drink industry was  approximately  1.4
million mt in the late  1990s,  the potential of a close market  for HFCS excess
capacity  was welcomed  by the U.S. industry.  This  can be seen  in the data as
HFCS-55  syrup  and  solids  exports  to  Mexico  rose  over  a  three-year  period
from 52,000 mt to over 207,000 mt in 1998 (Haley and Suarez).
NAFTA SUGAR  DISPUTES
Given the previous discussion it is not surprising that disagreement has
emerged between the United States and Mexican sugar industries and the United
States HFCS industry regarding interpretation of NAFTA.  While trade in sugar
and other sweeteners is  addressed directly by provisions of NAFTA and other
trade  agreements,  the  actual  process  of implementing  these  agreements  has
created  an uncertain  future  for  sugar and  HFCS  trade  between  the U.S.  and
Mexico.
The original NAFTA document (1995)  contained provisions related to
trade  in  sugar that  were  opposed  by many  in  the  U.S.  sugar industry.  This
opposition stemmed from the fear that NAFTA provisions allowing for increased
HFCS exports to Mexico would  displace  sugar consumption  in Mexico.  This
would then lead to a Mexican  sugar surplus that would likely be exported to the
United  States.  To  secure  U.S. Congressional  support for NAFTA,  the United
States and Mexican governments exchanged side-letters in November of 1993,
altering provisions of the original text.  Since that time, a trade dispute center-
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Figure  1:  Duty-Free  Mexican  Sugar Exportable to the United States
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Source:  FAS Online,  1998
ing on interpretation  of the content  and validity  of the side-letter  agreement,
has  emerged.
Net  Surplus Production Status
Mexican sugar exports to the United States were provisional upon sev-
eral conditions  under  the original  text of the Agreement.  During  the fifteen-
year  transition  period,  Mexican  exports  were  to  be capped  at  no  more  than
Mexico's  projected  net production  surplus  of  sugar, calculated  as  sugar pro-
duction  less  domestic  sugar consumption.  Mexico  was  allowed to  ship,  at  a
minimum,  7,258 MTRV of duty-free raw  sugar.  Duty-free access  was limited
to 25,000 MTRV for the first six years of the Agreement.  Following  this, the
maximum  duty-free  access  quantity was  to  become  150,000  MTRV  in  year
seven,  and the maximum duty-free quantity was  to increase by  10 percent  in
each subsequent year.  An important point to note is that these maximums could
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be exceeded if Mexico achieved net production surplus status for two consecu-
tive marketing  years (Haley  and Suarez).
Key NAFTA sugar provisions were changed under the side-letter agree-
ment.  The  sugar provisions  in  the NAFTA  agreement  modified  by  the  side
letter also link duty-free  sugar access  to  a "Net Surplus"  formula.  However,
under the amended agreement the net surplus is calculated as the sum of sugar
and HFCS consumption minus the production of sugar.  For the first six years,
through  September 30,  2000,  duty-free  access  is  limited to the amount of the
net surplus but not more  than 25,000 MTRV.  After this time,  duty-free  sugar
access is limited to the amount of net surplus, but not more than 250,000 MTRV
from 2001  to 2007,  regardless  of Mexico's  net surplus  producer  status.  The
NAFTA  duty  on  sugar trade  above  the  duty-free  levels declines  gradually  to
zero on January  1, 2008 (FAS).  A comparison of both maximum access levels
(with and without the  side-letter) is presented  in Figure 1.
The  validity  of the side letter  is  under dispute  by the  two countries.
Mexico asserts that its version does not include HFCS consumption in the for-
mula defining net surplus producer status.  In addition,  Mexico  maintains that
the  side letter does not limit exports to 250,000 mt per year during 2001-2007.
Based on Mexico's interpretation of the NAFTA agreement, the conditions have
already  been met to permit them to export total  net surplus  production to the
United States on a duty-free basis (Haley  and Suarez).
In  early  1998  the  Mexican  Secretariat  of Commerce  and  Industrial
Development (SECOFI) requested  consultations with the United States regard-
ing the validity of the NAFTA side-letter.  When no agreement was achieved in
November  1998,  when Mexico  formally  requested  a NAFTA  commission  to
settle the issue.  In this process, the commission would consider several options
for resolution;  none  of which, however,  are binding unless both parties agree.
If the Commission cannot resolve  the dispute within 30 days after it has con-
vened,  or some  other time agreed  upon by  both parties,  either  of the parties
may request an arbitration panel to resolve  the issue (Haley and Suarez).
Mexico  has been  a net exporter  of sugar  since  1994  and,  as a  result,
NAFTA has allowed  some duty-free  access to the higher priced  United States
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Figure 2:  Calculation of Mexican  Net Surplus Production and  Mexican
Sugar  Exportable  Duty-Free  to the  United Sates  Under
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Source: FAS  Online, 1998;  Economic Research  Service 1999;  and  Haley,  2000
market.  While Mexico's  sugar production has been increasing  throughout the
1990s, consumption has been declining.  Since 1997/98 when net exports were
estimated  at 650,000  MTRV,  Mexico  has qualified  as  a net  surplus producer
and qualified each year for NAFTA duty-free exports up to 25,000 MTRV (Haley
and Suarez).
Figure 2 presents comparisons of net surplus producer calculations  and
maximum  access  data under  the alternative  interpretations  of the Agreement
for years  six and  seven.  It is  interesting  to  note that  in both  years  Mexico
achieves  a positive net surplus producer status,  regardless of whether HFCS is
included in the calculation.  In addition, net surplus production is well over the
duty-free limit,  with or without the side  letter.  Given  this information,  it be-
comes clear that the side-letter provision limiting duty-free access  to 250,000
MTRV regardless of net surplus  production  status will benefit U.S.  sugar pro-
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HFCS  Issues
Events  associated  with  sugar-sweetener  trade between  the  U.S.  and
Mexico have raised  concern that the increased use of lower priced  HFCS will
displace  domestically  produced  Mexican  sugar.  Since  HFCS  costs  10  to 20
percent less than sugar,  switching from sugar to HFCS could result in signifi-
cant cost  savings  to  the  agribusiness  industry.  Approximately  one  third  of
Mexico's  total  caloric  sweetener  use  of 4.4  million  mt is for processes  that
could utilize HFCS.  However, many industrial consumers  of sugar are closely
associated  with  sugar  producers  and  have less  incentive  to switch  to HFCS
(Salsgiver).
When  the  United  States increased  its use of HFCS  in the  1970s  and
1980s,  the  move  was  accompanied  by  the  reduction  of imports  through  the
adoption  of  a tariff-rate  quota  system.  Given  the  decline  in domestic  sugar
consumption,  Mexico's  switch to HFCS is  apt to result in increased sugar ex-
ports.  Mexico's sugar industry will most likely attempt to control supply in the
higher-priced  domestic market,  while  exporting  its surplus  at the lower world
price.  Since the United  States price is  supported at a level that is significantly
higher than the world price, the United States  is an attractive export market for
Mexican  surplus  production  (Salsgiver).
HFCS  Import  Duties: The  Broomcorn Dispute
The provisions of NAFTA relating to HFCS call for the elimination  of
Mexico's duties from the base tariff of 15 percent.  The tariff is scheduled to be
eliminated by  2004 through equal  yearly reductions  over ten years.  Based on
these provisions,  a series  of investigations  and counter investigations  has  de-
veloped,  due in part  to the surge in Mexican imports  of U.S. produced HFCS.
In late  1996 the Mexican government announced increases  in import duties on
HFCS-42, HFCS-55, and crystalline fructose of 12.5 percent, 2.0 percent points
above the scheduled rate of 10.5 percent.  This action was designed to compen-
sate for damage stemming  from  a U.S. increase in tariffs  on Mexican broom-
corn  brooms.  In  late  1998,  the  12.5  percent  ad-valorem duty imposed by the
United  States was reduced to the NAFTA  specific rate of 6 percent;  as a result
Mexico removed its  retaliatory  duties on United  States HFCS  imports  (Haley
and Suarez).
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HFCS  Import  Duties:  U.S.  Dumping  Allegations
In early  1997,  at about  the same  time that HFCS  import duties  were
being increased in the broomcorn broom dispute, Mexico's National Sugar In-
dustry Chamber  accused U.S.  corn wet millers  of dumping HFCS  in Mexico.
Mexico's  SECOFI  responded by initiating  an  antidumping  investigation,  and
then imposed temporary tariffs on U.S.  HFCS.  The temporary  tariffs, ranging
from  $66.57 to $175.50  per metric ton on two grades of HFCS, apply to ship-
ments  from Cargill  Inc.,  A. E.  Staley  Manufacturing  Co.,  CPC  International
Inc.,  and Archer Daniels Midland Co.  U.S. HFCS producers argued  that only
producers of HFCS in Mexico, not sugar producers, should have legal standing
to  initiate  a dumping claim  against imported HFCS.  After further investiga-
tion, SECOFI  made the duties permanent in early  1998 (ERS,  1999-b).
During 1998,  SECOFI also investigated charges by the Mexican sugar
industry that  HFCS-90 was  being imported  to  avoid antidumping  duties  im-
posed on HFCS-55.  Upon completion of a seven-month investigation, SECOFI
imposed compensatory duties.  Imports from A. E. Staley Manufacturing Com-
pany are charged $90.26 per metric ton, and imports from Archer Daniels Mid-
land Company are charged  $55.37 per metric ton (ERS,  1999-b).
Also in 1998,  the U.S.  Corn Refiners' Association (CRA)  called for a
review  of Mexico's  antidumping  actions  under Chapter  19  of NAFTA.  Con-
current to these actions under NAFTA, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR)  announced  its plan  to  utilize  the World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)
dispute settlement  process  to challenge  Mexico's  actions.  The  USTR  made
two formal requests for the formation of a WTO panel (the first was blocked by
Mexico).  A preliminary ruling is expected by early 2000.  If the United States
wins the trade dispute, Mexico's imports of HFCS will likely continue to grow,
thus exacerbating the dispute regarding Mexican sugar exports  to the U.S. mar-
ket (ERS,  1999-b).
In 1998 the USTR also initiated an investigation in response to allega-
tions by the CRA that the Government of Mexico had denied fair and equitable
market opportunities to U.S. HFCS exporters.  The CRA asserts that the Mexi-
can government encouraged collusion between the Mexican sugar industry and
the Mexican  soft drink bottling industry.  The two parties  allegedly  conspired
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to limit purchases  of HFCS by  the  soft drink bottling  industry to 350,000  mt
per year in exchange  for a 20-percent  discount on  sugar for soft drinks.  The
USTR concluded  its formal investigation  without  determining that the allega-
tions were actionable. The USTR did indicate that its investigation raised enough
questions  regarding the  actions  of the Mexican government  to warrant further
examination and continued consultation with the government  on issues related
to HFCS trade (ERS,  1999-b).
Canada  - United  States  Sugar Disputes
While the focus of this chapter has been on disputes concerning Mexico
and the United States,  several  sugar issues have  also been in dispute between
Canada  and  the  Unites  States.  For example,  in  1995  Canada  initiated
anti-dumping duties on U.S. sugar companies (ERS, 1997).  These duties ranged
from  69 to  85  percent.  In  turn,  U.S.  sugar exports  to Canada fell from over
145,000 mt  in 1994 (ERS,  1995) to only  5,505 mt  in 1997 and 14,500 mt in
1998  (ERS,  1999-a).
Starting in 1995, Canadian sugar was allowed to enter the United States
with a low-duty only as part of the U.S. TRQ for refined sugar.  In  1997 refined
sugar beyond the  TRQ  was charged  the  high-duty of  17.65  cents  per pound.
The  U.S.  refined  sugar  TRQ  was  not  allocated,  but  was  distributed  on  a
first-come,  first-served basis.  As a result Canadian sugar exporters  competed
with other potential suppliers for a share of the total refined TRQ.  In Septem-
ber  1997, the United States and Canada reached an agreement whereby Canada
was allocated a quota of 10,300 MTRV for refined sugar originating in Canada.
Under  terms  of the  agreement,  Canada  is also permitted  to compete  for  any
quantity of the refined sugar TRQ that is not allocated among  supplying coun-
tries and is  not reserved  for specialty  sugar (ERS,  1997).
A compromise  was also reached concerning  trade in sugar-containing
products.  Canada alleged that certain  products being shipped from the United
States to Canada under the U.S.  sugar-containing  products  re-export program
were in violation of NAFTA.  Canada also claimed that exports of these prod-
ucts  from  Canada to the United  States had  been adversely  affected  when,  in
1995,  the  United  States reclassified  product into  a TRQ for sugar-containing
products.  Beginning with the 1997/98 sugar-containing product TRQ, the United
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States allocated 59,250 metric tons to Canada. The total annual sugar-containing
product TRQ is 64,709 metric tons. Given these developments,  Canada aban-
doned its NAFTA challenge to the U.S. sugar-containing product re-export pro-
gram (ERS,  1997).
CONCLUSIONS  AND  IMPLICATIONS
These disputes make liberalized sweetener  trade between  Mexico and
the United  States uncertain  in the near future.  However,  falling  world  sugar
prices also have the potential to increase the amount of Mexican sugar entering
the United  States  through  high-tier quotas.  NAFTA  established  a  declining
tariff schedule  for high-tier  raw  and refined  sugar imported  into  the United
States from Mexico.  During the NAFTA adjustment period through 2008,  the
maximum  world price  at which it becomes  profitable  to ship Mexican  sugar
into the U.S. market increases annually.  According to Haley and Suarez, given
the  declining  tariff schedule  for raw  sugar (assuming  marketing  costs  of 1.1
cents per pound for bringing Mexican sugar into the United States, and a United
States sugar price  of 22  cents  per pound),  a world price  below  7.3  cents  per
pound in 1999 would introduce the probability of high-tier imports from Mexico.
The TRQ policy  has kept the domestic  price of sugar high relative  to
the  domestic  price  of corn.  This relationship  contributed to  the  substantial
growth in  corn sweetener  demand,  and  HFCS  has  almost entirely  displaced
sugar in soft drinks.  With the expected influx of Mexican sugar into the United
States under  NAFTA,  domestic  demand for HFCS  will likely  fall as  sugar is
substituted back for corn sweeteners  (Uri  and Boyd,  1994).  Tanyeri-Abur,  et
al.  (1993), analyzing  the effects of a complete removal of U.S.  import quotas,
expect the domestic price of HFCS  to drop by five percent,  and domestic pro-
duction to fall by almost two-thirds.  This is an extreme  analogy, but similar
results would be expected  under NAFTA.  Sugar will become  more competi-
tive in domestic industries that use corn  sweeteners.
However, most expect a surge of HFCS exports from the United States
into Mexico.  Mexico will gradually eliminate its fifteen percent tariff on corn
sweeteners  under NAFTA.  By the year  2000, it is expected that a market for
approximately two million mt of sugar will exist in Mexico.  In addition, HFCS
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is a lower priced product than refined sugar, and Mexico is short on high qual-
ity domestic  refined sugar (Rivero,  1993).  Hence,  it is  expected  that NAFTA
will have a negative effect on U.S. HFCS demand, but a positive effect on Mexi-
can HFCS demand.  NAFTA's  effect on domestic  production and the price  of
corn  sweeteners remains  to be  seen.  It is noteworthy  that HFCS  composes a
modest  share  of total corn  production,  and thus  corn  prices  would  likely  be
unaffected  by the NAFTA  (Tanyeri-Abur,  1993).
It becomes clear that several significant disputes exist between Mexico
and the United States regarding  sugar and HFCS trade during the fifteen  year
NAFTA  transition  period.  Certainly,  both  sides  are  acting  in  the interest  of
their  producers.  Will  similar disputes  arise  following  the  transition  period,
given that free trade in sugar and agricultural based sweeteners is  scheduled to
occur at the end of year fifteen  of the Agreement?  A purpose of the transition
period was to gradually ease the Mexican and U.S. sugar industries into a state
of free trade in sugar.  Although this objective is being achieved to some extent,
the number of disputes and protests associated with the transition indicate that
it is certainly not painless.  Observers  should not be surprised if these and other
disputes related to sugar and agricultural-based  sweeteners  continue well past
the transition period.
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